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JOHANNS v. LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASS’N:
DEMISE OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
AGAINST COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
EDWARD J. SCHOEN ∗
MARGARET M. HOGAN ∗∗
JOSEPH S. FALCHEK ∗∗∗

I. INTRODUCTION
On May 23, 2005, the United States Supreme Court in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n. 529
(hereinafter referred to as Livestock Marketing) ruled that the United States Department of
Agriculture (hereinafter referred to as USDA) did not violate the First Amendment rights of beef
producers and ranchers by requiring them to contribute funds to support generic advertisements for
beef, 530 because the generic advertisements in question constituted the Government’s own
speech. 531 Mandated by the Beef Promotion and Research Act, 532 the advertisements were funded
through a $1 assessment fee per head of cattle sold. 533 Two associations of beef producers and
several individuals who raise and sell cattle objected unsuccessfully to the assessment on the
grounds that the beef advertisements violated their First Amendment, 534 because the
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529
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005).
530
Id. at 2066.
531
Id. at 2058.
532
Id. (“The statute directs the Secretary of Agriculture to implement this policy by issuing a Beef Promotion
and Research Order (Beef Order or Order), § 2903, and specifies four key terms it must contain: The
Secretary is to appoint a Cattlemen’s Beef Promotion and Research Board (Beef Board or Board), whose
members are to be a geographically representative group of beef producers and importers, nominated by
trade associations. § 2904(1). The Beef Board is to convene an Operating Committee, composed of 10 Beef
Board members and 10 representatives named by a federation of state beef councils. § 2904(4)(A). The
Secretary is to impose a $1-per-head assessment (or “checkoff”) on all sales or importation of cattle and a
comparable assessment on imported beef products. § 2904(8). And the assessment is to be used to fund
beef-related projects, including promotional campaigns, designed by the operating Committee and approved
by the Secretary. §§ 904(4)(B), (C).”)
533
Id. Many of the advertisements used the trademarked slogan, “Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner.” Id. at 2059.
534
Id. at 2059-2060.

advertisements promoted beef as a generic commodity and interfered with their efforts to promote
the superiority of particular types of beef. 535
Livestock Marketing is the third disparate decision of the United States Supreme Court in the
past eight years involving compelled commercial speech. Four years earlier, the United States
Supreme Court ruled in United States v. United Foods, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as United
Foods), 536 that the assessments imposed on mushroom growers to pay for generic advertisements
promoting the mushroom industry under the Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer
Information Act of 1990 537 violated First Amendment protections against compelled speech 538 and
compulsory financing of speech. 539 Four years before United Foods, the United States Supreme
Court decided in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. 540 (hereinafter referred to as Wileman
Bros.) that compulsory contributions to a generic advertising campaign promoting California tree
fruits (nectarines, peaches and plums) did not violate the First Amendment rights of the fruit
producers. 541
In order to set the stage for the analysis of Livestock Marketing, section II of this article will
briefly sketch the broad First Amendment background that provides a matrix for examining
Livestock Marketing. More particularly, because the beef, mushroom and fruit producers objected
that they were forced to be associated with, and to contribute financially to, commercial messages
with which they disagreed, this article will examine the leading United States Supreme Court
decisions providing First Amendment protection against compelled political speech and
compulsory financing of political or ideological views. Likewise, the use of mandatory student
fees to support student’s publications containing expression to which some students object is
analogous to mandatory contributions to advertisements to which the food producers objected.
Hence this article will also consider the leading United States Supreme Court decisions that
examined the First Amendment implications of state-related universities utilizing mandatory
student fees to support student organizations and expression, and upheld the use of mandatory
student fees to support student activities and publications. Part III of this article sketches the
trajectory of the Supreme Court compelled commercial speech decisions culminating in Livestock
Marketing, providing an analysis that assesses whether the First Amendment protections against
compelled political or ideological speech and compelled financing of political or ideological
speech continue to hold sway in the commercial speech arena. 542 Part IV of this article concludes
that further attempts to apply First Amendment restrictions against compelled political speech to
the commercial arena will be futile, and predicts that legitimate attempts to challenge advertising
programs mandated by government agencies will be thwarted by the Court’s endorsement of the
defense of government speech.

535

Id. (“Respondents noted that the advertising promotes beef as a generic commodity, which, they contended,
impedes their efforts to promote the superiority of, inter alia, American beef, grain-fed beef, or certified
Angus or Hereford beef.”).
536
United States v. United Foods, 121 S. Ct. 2334 (2001).
537
Mushroom Promotion, Research and Consumer Information Act, 104 Stat. 3854, 7 U.S.C. § 6101.
538
United Foods at 2341.
539
Id. at 2338.
540
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
541
Id. at 469.
542
Much of the analysis found in parts II and III of the article is based upon research appearing in prior
publications of the authors. See Edward J. Schoen and Margaret M. Hogan, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &
Elliott, Inc.: A Nettle in the Fruit Patch, 28 ACAD. OF LEGAL STUD. IN BUS. NAT’L PROC. 165-180 (1999);
Edward J. Schoen et. al., Glickman v. Wileman Bros.: California Fruit Marketing Orders Prune the First
Amendment, 10 WIDENER J. PUB. L., 21 (2000); and Edward J. Schoen et. al., United Foods and Wileman
Bros.: Protection Against Compelled Commercial Speech–Now You See It, Now You Don’t, 39 AMER. BUS.
L. J. 467 (2002).
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II. THE BACKGROUND
A. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST
COMPELLED POLITICAL SPEECH
The fruit growers and mushroom and beef producers objected to being forced to pay for and be
associated with advertisements promoting products they did not grow, produce or sell. The basis
of their objections was the First Amendment protection not only to express and craft opinions and
viewpoints, but also to avoid being associated with the viewpoints of others.
The United States Supreme Court has strongly endorsed First Amendment protections against
compelled political or ideological speech on at least five occasions. In West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette (hereinafter referred to as Barnette), 543 the Court decided that compelling
teachers and students to participate in salute-to-the-flag ceremonies violated the First
Amendment, 544 because they were required to publicly demonstrate acceptance of the political
ideas symbolized by the flag by saluting and pledging allegiance to it. 545 The Court emphatically
struck down mandatory salute-to-the-flag ceremonies: “If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein.” 546
The United States Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Wooley v. Maynard
(hereinafter referred to as Maynard). 547 In Maynard, a married couple covered the state motto
“Live Free or Die” on their New Hampshire license plate, because it was contrary to their religious
and moral beliefs, and sought declaratory judgment that the statute mandating that the slogan
appear on the license plate and making it a misdemeanor to obscure the state motto violated the
First Amendment. The Court ruled that New Hampshire cannot constitutionally force an
individual to display and disseminate an ideological message with which they disagree. 548 The
rights of individuals “to avoid becoming the courier” of messages contrary to their beliefs
outweighed any interest of the state to promote an appreciation of state history and to foment state
pride. 549
In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of N.C., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Riley), 550 the
United States Supreme Court decided that the North Carolina Charitable Solicitations Act
(hereinafter referred to as “the Solicitations Act”) unconstitutionally infringed on free speech. The
Solicitations Act required professional fundraisers to inform solicited donors of the percentage of
gross of revenues retained in previous charitable solicitations. 551 Because the solicitation of
charitable contributions is protected speech, state mandated disclosure requirements imposed on

543

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
The punishment inflicted on students who refused to participate in salute-to-the-flag ceremonies was
expulsion. Readmission was denied until the student complied with the policy. Id at 629.
545
Id. at 633, 634. (“The “Bill of Rights which guards the individual’s right to speak his own mind [does not
permit] public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind.”).
546
Id. at 641.
547
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
548
Id. at 713. This ruling was founded on the correlative propositions inherent in the right to speak:
[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. A system which secures the right to
proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to
foster such concepts. The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary
components of the broader concept of “individual freedom of mind.” [citations omitted]. Id. at 716-17.
549
Id. at 715-17.
550
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
551
Id. at 784.
544
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fundraisers must pass muster under the First Amendment. 552 The Court in Riley struck down the
mandated disclosure requirement, because the Solicitations Act required professional fundraisers to
engage in “compelled speech” and North Carolina had not advanced a sufficient state interest to
justify the required disclosure. 553
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston (hereinafter referred to
as Hurley), 554 the United States Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the South Boston Allied
War Veterans Council (hereinafter referred to as the Veterans Council), an unincorporated
association of individuals who organize the annual St. Patrick’s-Evacuation Day Parade
(hereinafter referred to as the parade), could not be compelled to allow the Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB), a social organization of homosexuals, bisexuals
and their supporters, to march in the parade. 555 The Court noted that the First Amendment protects
the rights of individuals to craft their own multifaceted message, and decided that the Veterans
Council was entitled to such protection in selecting the contingents appearing in the parade. 556 The
Court further held that applying the state’s public accommodation law to the parade forced the
Veterans Council “to alter the expressive content of their parade,” 557 and violated “the fundamental
rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the
content of his own message.” 558
Finally, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 559 the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Boy
Scouts of America (hereinafter referred to as the BSA) was not required by New Jersey’s public
accommodations law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to reinstate an
adult assistant scoutmaster, 560 who was an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist. 561 A
private, nonprofit organization whose mission is to instill its system of values in young people 562
and to provide a positive moral code for living, 563 the BSA maintains that homosexual conduct is
contrary to the moral values it promotes, 564 believes homosexuals do not provide a desirable role
model consistent with its moral values, 565 and refuses to permit homosexuals to become members
552

Id. at 789, citing Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (invalidating a local
ordinance requiring charitable solicitors to use, for charitable purposes 75% of the funds solicited), and
Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984) (invalidating statute prohibiting
charitable solicitation contracts in which the fundraiser retained more than 25% of the money collected).
553
Riley at 798 (“We believe, therefore, that North Carolina’s content-based regulation is subject to exacting
First Amendment scrutiny. The State asserts as its interest the importance of informing donors how the
money they contribute is spent in order to dispel the alleged misperception that the money they give to a
professional fundraisers go in greater-than-actual proportion to benefit charity. To achieve this goal, the
State has adopted a prophylactic rule of compelled speech, applicable to all professional solicitations. We
conclude that this interest is not as weighty as the State asserts, and that the means chosen to accomplish it
are unduly burdensome and not narrowly tailored.”)
554
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
555
Id. at 560, 580-81.
556
Id.
557
Id. at 572-73.
558
Id. at 573. The Court continued:
Indeed, this general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies not only to expressions of
value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid, subject,
perhaps, to the permissive law of defamation. Nor is the rule’s benefit restricted to the press, being enjoyed
by business corporations generally and by ordinary people engaged in unsophisticated expression as well as
by professional publishers. Its point is simply the point of all speech protection, which is to shield just those
choices of content that in someone’s eyes are misguided, or even hurtful. Id. at 573-74.
559
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
560
Id. at 661.
561
Id. at 644.
562
Id. at 649.
563
Id. at 650.
564
Id. at 650-51.
565
Id. at 652.
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or leaders of the BSA.
The court decided that requiring the BSA to reinstate a community
leader and gay rights activist to his position of assistant scout master “would, at the very least,
force [the BSA] to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that [the BSA]
accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior,” 567 undermines the BSA’s official
position with respect to homosexual conduct, 568 and associates the BSA with a message it chooses
not to send, 569 contrary to the First Amendment. In short, the First Amendment supports the
BSA’s refusal to be associated with a message or communication contrary to the organization’s
core values and mission.
The five United States Supreme Court opinions discussed above are remarkably dissimilar, each
involving different messages and means of expression. In combination, however, the five cases
give meaningful protection under the First Amendment to express and tailor views and opinions, to
avoid association with expressions of others, and to “guarantee that no government official can
proscribe orthodoxy in thought or opinion, or compel an individual by word or act to express,
participate, or concur in the dissemination of the ideas or messages of others.” 570
B. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS AGAINST
COMPELLED FINANCING OF POLITICAL SPEECH
Because the beef, mushroom and fruit producers protested that they were wrongfully forced to
pay for advertisements for food products that they could not market or sell, it is useful to review
United States Supreme Court decisions establishing significant First Amendment protection
against compelled financing of political or ideological speech to ascertain whether those rights are
transferable to the commercial arena.
In International Association of Machinists v. Street (hereinafter referred to as Street), 571 the
Court ruled that, under the First Amendment, union dues could be used to support collective
bargaining activities, but could not be used to finance the political campaigns of candidates for
public office or to promote political causes, doctrines and ideas without the agreement of duespaying members. 572
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (hereinafter referred to as Abood), 573 the United States
Supreme Court unanimously upheld a Michigan statute permitting union representation of local
government employees under an “agency shop” arrangement, in which every employee was
represented by the union and non-union members were required to pay a service charge equal in
amount to union dues. 574 The assessment of such service charges to finance collective bargaining
did not violate the First Amendment rights of the non-union members, but was justified by the
labor relations system established by Congress. 575 Notably, however, the union was prohibited
from requiring employees to contribute to the support of political or ideological causes they
opposed as a condition of employment as public school teachers. 576 Using union members’
566

Id.
Id. at 653.
568
Id. at 655.
569
Id. at 656.
570
Schoen et al, United Foods and Wileman Bros.: Protection Against Compelled Commercial Speech–Now
You See It, Now You Don’t, supra note 14, at 475.
571
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
572
Id. at 746. 765, 767, 768. The funds could be used to defray the expenses of the negotiation or
administration of collective agreements, or the expenses entailed in the adjustment of grievances and
disputes.
573
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
574
Id. at 220. See DONALD M. GILLMOR et al., MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS, at 151
(5th ed. 1990).
575
Abood, 431 U.S. at 221-22.
576
Id.
567
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compulsory contributions for political purposes violated their First Amendment rights, 577 because
they were compelled to support a political viewpoint as a condition of public employment. 578
In Keller v. State Bar of California (hereinafter referred to as Keller), 579 the United States
Supreme Court unanimously held that requiring members of the State Bar of California
(hereinafter referred to as the State Bar) to pay dues that are used to fund political and ideological
causes with which lawyers disagreed, violated their First Amendment rights. Those expenditures
were used to support lobbying, to file amicus curiae briefs, and to organize annual State Bar
conferences, 580 and had nothing to do with regulating the legal profession or improving legal
services. 581 The United States Supreme Court determined that the relationship between the
lawyers and the State Bar was similar to that of union members and their unions. 582 This permitted
the Court to apply the Abood analysis to the State Bar’s use of member dues 583 and to determine
that lawyers should be required to pay the cost of regulating the profession and improving the
educational and ethical standards of its members, 584 but could not be compelled to support through
their dues political or ideological activities unrelated to the purpose of regulating and improving
the legal profession. 585
Street, Abood, and Keller provide significant protection from compelled financing of political or
ideological speech under the First Amendment. Union workers, public school teachers, and
practicing lawyers cannot be required to pay dues to support political viewpoints with which they
disagree, to contribute to causes they oppose as a condition of employment, or to disseminate ideas
or positions unrelated to improving their profession. The First Amendment not only preserves
freedom to express opinions and avoid association with the expressions of others, but also protects
all individuals from being compelled to finance the viewpoints of others. 586
C. MANDATORY STUDENT FEES TO SUPPORT EXTRACURRICULAR
ACTIVITIES AND PUBLICATIONS
In Livestock Marketing, United Foods, and Wileman Bros., the beef, mushroom and fruit
producers objected to government-mandated contributions to support advertisements for food
products they did not produce or were prohibited from producing. Analogously, the United States
Supreme Court has twice ruled on the First Amendment implications of state-related universities’
577

Id. at 235.
Id. The Court’s holding in Abood was reiterated in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 520-21
(1991).
579
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
580
Id.
581
Id. at 5, 14-15.
582
Id. at 12.
583
Id. at 9, 13-14.
584
Id. at 12-13.
585
Id. at 13-14. The Court also notes that compliance with Abood and Keller is neither difficult nor
burdensome. Rather, the constitutional requirements for the collection and use of fees are providing an
adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the
fee before an impartial decision maker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such
challenges are pending. Id. at 16. See Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
586
Additional support for this proposition exists in two United States Supreme Court decisions dealing with
First Amendment protection of public utility political speech: Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980) (the order of the New York Public Service Commission
that prohibits the inclusion of inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy in the monthly bills
mailed to public utility companies to its customers violated the First Amendment); and Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Publ. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 543 (1986) (the order of the California Public Utilities
Commission requiring Pacific Gas and Electric Company to include communications with ratepayers
prepared by a public interest organization in its billing envelopes violated the First Amendment). Both of
these decisions provide strong protection to the political speech of regulated utilities.
578
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charging mandatory student activities fees to support student activities and publications. The First
Amendment implications of mandatory student activity fees are best understood from two
perspectives: (1) whether the university can refuse to fund certain publications from student
activity fees because of the content or viewpoint of the publications; and (2) whether university
students can insist that the student activity fees they pay can be withheld from supporting student
publications with which they disagree.
The first perspective is provided by Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia
(hereinafter referred to as Rosenberger), 587 in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that
the University of Virginia violated the First Amendment by withholding payment authorization to
an outside contractor for printing a student newspaper promoting Christian values and
viewpoints. 588 The newspaper was produced by Wide Awake Productions, a student organization
recognized and sanctioned by the university. 589 Under university guidelines, recognized student
organizations were permitted to submit disbursement requests to pay outside contractors for
expenses related to student news, information and opinion; however, expenses related to religious
activities were excluded from the disbursement request program. 590 Wide Awake Publications
submitted a disbursement request to pay its printer $5,862 for the cost of printing its newspaper, 591
but the university denied the request because of the religious perspective of the newspaper. 592
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the University of Virginia’s refusal to pay the
publication costs of the student newspaper because it promoted Christianity constituted
government-imposed viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. 593 Having
established a “limited public forum” for the expression of various student viewpoints through its
disbursement request procedures, 594 the university was prohibited by the First Amendment from
excluding Wide Awake Publications because of its advocacy of a Christian perspective. 595
Furthermore, the use of student fees to pay publication costs for a student newspaper promoting a
Christian perspective does not violate the Establishment Clause, because the university’s student
activities fee, unlike taxes levied for direct support of a church or group of churches, was “neutral
toward religion.” 596
The second perspective–whether university students can insist that the student activity fees they
paid can be withheld from student publications with which they disagree–is provided by Board of
Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth (hereinafter referred to as
Southworth). 597 In Southworth, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment
permits public universities to charge mandatory student activity fees to fund extracurricular student
speech if the funds are allocated in a viewpoint-neutral manner. 598 The Court also ruled in
Southworth that the university was not required to implement an optional payment or refund
system to accommodate those students who complain that the student fees they paid support
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content or viewpoint to which they object, because the content and viewpoint neutrality
requirement of the university is sufficient to protect the rights of the complaining students. 599
Both Rosenberger and Southworth have bearing on the mandatory fees imposed by the USDA
on the beef, mushroom and fruit producers to finance commercial messages to which the producers
objected. The mandatory fees collected from students supported activities and publications that
enhanced the education of university students; the mandatory fees collected from beef, mushrooms
and fruit producers supported advertisements that enhanced public awareness of the value of food
products. Likewise, in both instances, government agencies required university students or food
producers respectively to pay fees that financed expression, and individuals paying the mandatory
fees objected to being associated with the ensuing message. While Rosenberger and Southworth
occurred in an educational setting and Livestock Marketing, United Foods and Wileman Bros.
occurred in a commercial setting, all of the decisions involved government agencies that employed
procedural or regulatory programs of compelled financing of speech. The main difference between
Rosenberger and Southworth on the one hand, and Livestock Marketing, United Foods and
Wileman Bros. on the other, is that the universities claimed they were not the speakers but merely
supported and encouraged students’ speech. 600 In contrast, food producers in Livestock Marketing,
United Foods and Wileman Bros. were required to support financially generic advertisements that
were government speech. In the former instance, the state-related universities cannot make
content-based choices; in the latter instance, the government agency may make content-based
choices. 601 Hence, under Rosenberger and Southworth the government may require food
producers to pay mandatory fees to support advertisements for food products even if the
government agency employs content or viewpoint discrimination.

III. COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH DECISIONS
A. ANALYSIS OF WILEMAN BROS.
602

the United States Supreme Court ruled that compelling growers and
In Wileman Bros.
handlers of nectarines, peaches, and plums to contribute money to pay for an advertising campaign
for California fruits constitutes a valid economic regulation within the Commerce Clause and does
not violate the First Amendment. 603 The Court determined initially that the USDA regulatory
scheme did not raise an issue of speech but constituted only an issue of economic regulation
implemented through marketing orders. 604 In doing so, the Court emphasized three characteristics
of the regulatory scheme: the marketing orders (1) did not stop any producer from communicating
any message, (2) did not force anyone to engage in actual or symbolic speech, and (3) did not
mandate any endorsement or financing of a political viewpoint. 605 Hence, because the
advertisements did not trigger fundamental First Amendment implications, the Court concluded
that the USDA marketing orders should be reviewed like other governmental regulatory

587

Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
Id. at 845-46.
589
Id. at 825-26.
590
Id. at 824. A “religious activity” was defined as any activity that “primarily promotes or manifests a
particular belief about a deity.” Id. at 825.
591
Id. at 827.
592
Id.
593
Id. at 828-29, 837.
594
Id. at 829.
595
Id. at 830-31. “The Guideline invoked by the University to deny third-party contractor payments on behalf
of [Wide Awake Publications] effects a sweeping restriction on student thought and student inquiry in the
context of University sponsored publications.” Id. at 836.
596
Id. at 840-41.
597
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
598
Id. at 234.
588

599

Id. at 230.
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834-35; Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229.
Rosenberger at 833 (“[W]hen the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices. When the
University determines the content of the education it provides, it is the University speaking, and we have
permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when
it enlists private entities to convey its own message. . . . [W]hen the government appropriates public funds
to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes. When the government disburses
public funds to private entities to convey a government message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps
to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.”)
602
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
603
Id. at 469. See 8 ABA PREVIEW, July 8, 1997, at 63.
604
Id. at 476.
605
Id. at 469-70.
600
601
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606

programs.
The Court also eschewed the fruit producers’ and handlers’ objections that they were
forced to finance a generic advertising program in violation of the First Amendment. 607
Unfortunately, this conclusion is belied by the record before the Court, which demonstrates that the
fruit producers strenuously objected to the advertising because it associated them with their
competitors’ products. Hence, the Court created an erroneous distinction that removed the fruit
producers’ and handlers’ objections from the purview of the First Amendment and enabled the
Court to decide that the USDA could make producers and growers pay for advertisements with
which they did not want to be associated. The compelled speech was simply ancillary to a broader
regulatory program. This distinction eliminates any need to evaluate the compulsory nature of the
marketing orders under the First Amendment, and denigrates First Amendment protections against
compelled speech.

values the freedom resulting from speech in all its diverse parts. First
Amendment concerns apply here because of the requirement that producers
subsidize speech with which they disagree. 613

81F

87F

United Foods wanted to advertise its mushrooms as branded and superior in quality; the USDA
advertising message promoted generic mushrooms. 614 Hence the USDA forced the mushroom
producers to subsidize government speech with which the producers did not want to be associated.
This compelled financial support of speech troubled the Court, 615 and, in order to escape its
statement in Wileman Bros. that the marketing orders did not raise First Amendment concerns, 616
the Court attempted to distinguish Wileman Bros. and United Foods. In doing so, the Court
focused on the regulatory nature of the marketing orders in Wileman Bros., noting (1) that the
California fruit advertising program was ancillary to a comprehensive USDA program, 617 and (2)
that the mushroom advertising program in United Foods was a central component of the USDA’s
regulatory scheme. 618 Hence, the Wileman Bros. regulatory scheme required financial support of a
comprehensive regulatory program, only a small part of which involved fruit advertisement. 619
The regulatory scheme in United Foods, however, devoted almost all of the collected funds for one
purpose, generic advertising. 620
Having so distinguished Wileman Bros. and United Foods, the Court applied Street, Abood, and
Keller to invalidate the United Foods regulatory scheme as violative of the First Amendment. 621
The explicit attachment of First Amendment protections against compelled speech and compelled
financing of speech to commercial speech is a First Amendment gain, though as noted below the
constitutional victory may be hollow. Moreover, the Court backed away from its conclusion in
Wileman that marketing orders do not force individuals to speak or endorse the speech of others,
but merely mandates the financing of advertising, 622 and concluded that mandatory assessments
improperly required the producers to support the speech of others. 623
8F

89F

90F

91F

B. ANALYSIS OF UNITED FOODS

92F

In United Foods, 608 the United States Supreme Court decided that assessments imposed on the
mushroom industry for generic advertising programs designed to promote the industry under the
Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act of 1990 (hereinafter “the
Mushroom Act”), 609 violated the First Amendment. The Court determined that the assessments
were not ancillary to a more comprehensive regulatory program; rather, the advertising in question
was the main component of the regulatory scheme. 610
The court initially noted that the First Amendment prevents the government from prohibiting
speech, from compelling individuals to express certain views, 611 and from requiring individuals to
subsidize speech to which they object. 612 The Court then applied those First Amendment
protections to commercial speech:
82F

83F
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93F

94F
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The fact that the speech is in aid of a commercial purpose does not deprive
respondent of all First Amendment protection . . . . The subject matter of
the speech may be of interest to but a small segment of the population; yet
those whose business and livelihood depend in some way upon the product
involved no doubt deem First Amendment protection to be just as important
for them as it is for other discrete, little noticed groups in a society which
606

613

607

614

Id. at 469-70.
Id. at 470-71. The Court stated:
Our compelled speech case law . . . is clearly inapplicable to the regulatory scheme at issue here. The
use of assessments to pay for advertising does not require respondents to repeat an objectionable
message out of their own mouths, require them to use their own property to convey an antagonistic
ideological message, force them to respond to a hostile message when they ‘would prefer to remain
silent,’ . . . or require them to be publicly identified or associated with another’s message . . .
Respondents are not required themselves to speak, but are merely required to make contributions for
advertising. With trivial exceptions on which the Court did not rely, none of the generic advertising
conveys any message with which respondents disagree. Furthermore, the advertising is attributed not to
them, but to the California Tree Fruit Agreement or California Summer Fruits [citations omitted].
608
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 2334 (2001).
609
7 U.S.C. § 6101.
610
United Foods, 121 S. Ct. at 2341. In reaching its decision, the United States Supreme Court focused its
attention on a narrow issue: “whether the government may underwrite and sponsor speech with a certain
viewpoint using special subsidies exacted from a designated class of persons, some of whom object to the
idea being advanced.” Id. By framing the issue this way, the Court indicated its receptiveness to the defense
of government speech.
611
Id. at 2338, citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) and W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
612
United Foods, 121 S. Ct. at 2338, citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and Keller v.
State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990).

United Foods, 121 S. Ct. at 2338.
Id.
615
Id. (“First Amendment values are at serious risk if the government can compel a particular citizen, or a
discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for speech on the side that it favors; and there is no
apparent principle which distinguishes out of hand minor debates about whether a branded mushroom is
better than just any mushroom. As a consequence, the compelled funding for the advertising must pass First
Amendment scrutiny.”)
616
Wileman Bros., 521 U.S. at 469.
617
United Foods, 121 U.S. at 2339.
618
Id.
619
Id.
620
Id. The Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit that “the mushroom growing business . . . is unregulated, except
for the enforcement of a regional mushroom advertising program,” and “the mushroom market has not been
collectivized, exempted from antitrust laws, subjected to a uniform price, or otherwise subsidized through
price supports or restrictions on supply.” Id.
621
Id.
622
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 470-71 (1997).
623
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 2334, 2340 (2001). The Court observed:
It is true that the party who protests the assessment here is required simply to support speech by others, not to
utter the speech itself. We conclude, however, that the mandated support is contrary to the First Amendment
principles set forth in cases involving expression by groups which include persons who object to the speech,
but who, nevertheless, must remain members of the group by law or necessity.
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Unfortunately, these distinctions are so torturously drawn by the Court that United Food’s
rationale is difficult to comprehend and apply. 624 In effect, First Amendment protections apply
only if (1) an association member objects to the commercial speech, (2) the commercial speech is
only indirectly related to the central purpose of the required association, and (3) the association
itself is “part of a far broader regulatory system that is not principally concerned with the speech in
question.” 625 What that means may be anyone’s guess. Hence, any First Amendment victory
contained in United Foods is uncertain at best.
9F
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speech aspects of the beef assessment program: classifying the assessment program as compelled
government speech outside the purview of the First Amendment. 634
The Court determined that the Federal Government itself effectively controlled the promotional
beef campaign, 635 that the message contained in the beef promotion was established by the Federal
Government, 636 that Congress and the Secretary of USDA specified the central message and its
elements, 637 that the Secretary has final approval authority to control every word used in the
promotional campaign, 638 and that the government set the overall message to be communicated and
approved every word that is disseminated. 639 Because of the government’s pervasive authority over
the beef promotion, the Court had little difficulty in concluding that the government speech
defense applied and eradicated the beef producers’ First Amendment objections to the beef
assessment program. 640
108F

109F

10F
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12F

13F

C. ANALYSIS OF LIVESTOCK MARKETING
In Livestock Marketing, the United States Supreme Court upheld a mandatory assessment of $1
per head of cattle sold or imported to finance market and food science research into the nutritional
value of beef and promotional campaigns to market beef domestically and overseas. 626 Two beef
producer associations and several beef ranchers objected to the assessment, because the
promotional campaigns focused on beef as a generic product which impeded their efforts to
promote the superiority of American beef, grain-fed beef, or certified Angus or Hereford beef. 627
In addressing the beef producers’ First Amendment objection to the mandatory assessment
program, the Court initially reiterated the holdings of Barnette, Maynard, Keller, and Abood, and
acknowledged that those decisions led the Court in United Foods to “sustain a compelled subsidy
challenge to an assessment very similar to the beef checkoff, imposed to fund mushroom
advertising.” 628 The Court emphasized, however, that its decision in United Foods was based on
“the assumption that the advertising was private speech, not government speech.” 629 Likewise,
because the mushroom assessment in United Foods was not part of a “broader regulatory scheme”
but was created solely to fund advertising for mushrooms, the nature of the program was purely
compelled speech contrary to the First Amendment. 630
Notably, the Government did not argue in either Wileman Bros. or United Foods that the use of
mandatory assessments to fund generic advertisements was permissible government speech; 631
hence, the Court could not consider the defense of government speech in either decision. 632 The
Government in Livestock Marketing, however, contended at trial and on appeal that the beef
assessment “survives First Amendment scrutiny because it funds only government speech.” 633
This permitted the United States Supreme Court to take an entirely new tack in resolving the
compelled southernlawjournal

14F

10F

IV. CONCLUSION: DEMISE OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
FROM COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
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103F

104F

105F
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As noted in section II, various United States Supreme Court decisions have established
significant First Amendment protections against compelled political speech. The Wooley v.
Maynard 641 decision held that one cannot be required to “participate in the dissemination of
information . . . in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the
public.” 642 In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 643 the Court ruled
that the imposition of a reasonable fee limitation on charitable solicitors was an unreasonable
burden on protected speech and not narrowly tailored to the State’s interest in preventing fraud. 644
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 645 the Court ruled
that a parade is not a public accommodation but an expression of speech, 646 and that parade
organizers have the authority to choose the content of their own message, that is, they may choose
the contingents permitted to parade, and hence pick and choose the ideas conveyed in the
parade. 647 In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court ruled that compelling the BSA to reinstate
an assistant scoutmaster who was an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist compromised the
BSA’s official policy of considering homosexual activity to be immoral, and that the BSA was
15F
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120F
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634

624

The compelled speech in Wileman Bros. was merely supportive of the highly regulated nature of the
California fruit industry, and hence did not violate the First Amendment (just as union members cannot
object to payments supporting the primary role of the union to represent the workers in the negotiating
process). On the other hand, the compelled speech in United Foods did not promote collective “group
action,” except to “generate the very speech to which some handlers object,” and compelled subsidies for
speech should not be upheld if “their principal object is speech itself.” Hence, the Abood rationale applies,
and “the assessments are not permitted under the First Amendment.”
625
Id. at 2341.
626
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n., 125 S. Ct. 2055, 2059, 2066 (2005).
627
Id. at 2060.
628
Id. at 2061.
629
Id.
630
Id.
631
Id. at 2061 note 3.
632
The door to the government speech defense was opened in Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 1213 (1990): “If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with
which he disagreed, debate over issue of great concern to the public would be limited to those in the public
sector, and the process of government as we know it radically transformed.
633
Id. at 2060.

17F

Id at 2062. The Court noted:
‘Compelled support of government’–even those programs of government one does not approve of–is of
course perfectly constitutional, as every taxpayer must attest. And some government programs involve, or
entirely consist of, advocating a position. ‘The government, as a general rule, may support valid programs
and policies by taxes or other exactions binding on protesting parties. Within this broader principle it seems
inevitable that funds raised by the government will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and
defend its own policies.’ We have generally assumed, though not yet squarely held, that compelled funding
of government speech does not alone raise First Amendment concerns.
635
Id.
636
Id.
637
Id. at 2063.
638
Id.
639
Id.
640
Id. at 2066
641
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
642
Id. at 713.
643
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n. of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
644
Id. at 789-90.
645
Supra note 26.
646
Id. at 568, 572-73.
647
Id. at 573.
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permitted to deny membership and leadership positions to individuals practicing lifestyles contrary
to the BSA’s organizational values and mission. 648
Similarly, individuals have the right not to support or contribute to political or ideological
causes with which they disagree, and not to have their organizational dues, fees and assessments
applied to support causes with which they do not wish to be associated. This was affirmed in
Street, Abood, and Keller reviewed above. Each of those decisions explicitly recognized the right
of an organization to collect fees such as union dues or professional association dues for purposes
connected with collective bargaining, contract administration, and professional regulation. Each of
the decisions expressly prohibited the use of such fees to support a political or ideological cause to
which the union member or professional member does not subscribe.
While those First Amendment protections are compelling, the United States Supreme Court has
vacillated when asked to extend them to the arena of commercial speech. In Wileman Bros., the
Court eschewed any expansion of those protections in instances involving compelled speech that
were only a minor part of a broader regulatory scheme.
In United Foods, the Court unleashed a convoluted theory that provides First Amendment
protections against compelled commercial speech and compelled financing of commercial speech
when (1) the commercial speech is not directly related to or supportive of the purpose of the
compelled association, and (2) the association is simply a part of a larger regulatory scheme not
concerned principally with speech. These two torturously drawn elements are difficult to
understand and appear to have little application beyond mandatory membership in associations
strenuously regulated by the government. Hence any First Amendment protection delivered by
United Foods is uncertain at best.
In Livestock Marketing, the Court readily used the government speech defense to squelch further
attempts to extend protections against compelled political speech and compelled financing of
political speech to the commercial arena, perhaps to foreclose a tumult of ensuing litigation.
Generic ad campaigns have been litigated over “California tree fruits, mushrooms, beef, milk,
avocados, grapes, apples, port, and alligators,” and court dockets are “littered with these types of
cases.” 649 To the extent that the government sets the overall message to be communicated and
approves the wording of the generic advertisements as part of an advertising assessment program
to promote consumption of agricultural products and livestock, the government speech defense will
cleanse dockets of First Amendment challenges to USDA marketing orders.
Unlike state-related universities which may assess student fees to support speech and expression
but cannot engage in content or viewpoint discrimination, government agencies may assess fees to
finance their own speech and freely engage in content and viewpoint discrimination. In both cases,
individuals may be forced to be associated with and pay for messages with which they disagree.650
Following Wileman Bros., one commentator was concerned that “[i]t seems anomalous for the
Court to protect advertising when the government tries to restrict it, but abandon it as nonspeech
when the government compels it,” 651 and that:

106/Vol.16/Southern Law Journal

[G]overnment may have ‘free rein’ to ‘force payment for a whole variety of
expressive conduct that it could not restrict.’ The danger is that instead of
taking responsibility for messages that it wishes to foster -- and being held
accountable by the public for using tax dollars to do so -- government can
surreptitiously communicate its message through the pocketbooks of private
speakers. 652
126F

Following Livestock Marketing, the concern may very well be that the government can compel
commercial speech and its financing by structuring it as government speech. The pitfalls created
by the defense of government speech are underscored by the highly regulated nature of various
industries–e.g., energy, health care, and transportation–and the difficulty in drawing a clear line
between commercial and political speech 653–e.g., advertisements for nuclear energy, family
planning, and hybrid vehicles. While the First Amendment may preclude the government from
restricting such advertisements, Livestock Marketing may empower the government to compel
companies to finance such advertisements.
In the authors’ judgment, further attempts to apply First Amendment restrictions against
compelled political speech and compelled financing of commercial speech to commercial speech
are fruitless, because the defense of government speech trumps those claims. Without violating the
First Amendment, government agencies may henceforth not only mandate advertising programs
but freely employ content and viewpoint discrimination in crafting the advertisements. May First
Amendment protection of compelled commercial speech rest in peace.
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648

Supra note 31, at 656.
Daniel L. Hudson. Are Generic Beef Ads Examples of Unconstitutional Compelled Speech or Permissible
Government Speech?, 3 ABA PREVIEW 173, 175 (2004).
650
This may not be so threatening as it may appear at first. To the extent government agencies assess fees to
support speech and expression, the prohibition on government content and viewpoint discrimination protects
free speech. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 230, 233 (2000).
To the extent government agencies assess fees to support government speech, democratic processes check
government overreach, and make government agencies accountable for the use of tax revenues to pay for
government fostered messages. Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 125 S. Ct. 2055, 2064 (2005); Board
of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000), and Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
651
Commercial Speech–Compelled Advertising, 111 HARVARD L. REV. 319, 325 (1997).
649

652
653

Id. at 329.
See Commercial Speech–Compelled Advertising, supra note 123 at 327-28 (“Lower Courts could read
Wileman Bros. to foreclose First Amendment protection of nonpolitical or nonideological advertising even
when there is actual disagreement about the advertising content. Increasingly advertisers are utilizing
controversial, eye-catching imagery that–although not overtly political–may be equally objectionable. But if
Justice Souter’s interpretation of the majority’s analysis–that the critical requirement is that speech must be
political or ideological, regardless whether there is actual disagreement–is correct, then government may be
constitutionally able to compel nonpolitical but clearly objectionable speech.”).

